How Did We Get Here? An Honest Look at North Burnett Regional Councils Financial Crisis.

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A larger report with tables

Wondering how our region ended up with a massive rate hike? The answer is complex and involves shared responsibility. This report examines the State Government’s role in creating a flawed council and the subsequent local governance issues that made things worse.  

We present a balanced view to help ratepayers understand the full picture. Read our analysis and the proposal to bring in outside expertise to find real solutions.

Section 1: The Genesis of Crisis: An Unsettled Union in North Burnett

The profound financial and governance crisis currently engulfing the North Burnett Regional Council (NBRC) is not a recent phenomenon, nor is it the result of a single poor decision. Its origins are deeply rooted in the council’s very creation. A forensic examination of the 2008 Queensland local government amalgamations reveals that the NBRC was a structurally flawed entity from its inception, a fact that was knowable to the State Government at the time of its formation. The state-mandated merger created a fundamentally unsustainable mismatch between a vast, duplicated, and aging asset base and a small, geographically dispersed, and demographically static ratepayer base. This “original sin” of the amalgamation process set the stage for the sixteen years of financial distress and governance turmoil that have followed, culminating in the recent extreme rate rise that has pushed the community to a tipping point.

The State’s Mandate: A Contradictory Policy

The sweeping local government reforms of 2008 were publicly justified by the Queensland Government with a singular, pressing rationale: to enhance the “long-term financial sustainability” of its councils.¹ This policy was presented as a necessary response to a prevailing view that numerous smaller local government areas were financially “at risk” and lacked the scale required for effective governance and resource management.¹ Initially, the state pursued a collaborative reform model, the “Size, Shape and Sustainability” (SSS) initiative, which encouraged voluntary reform through resource sharing and mergers.¹

However, in a “shock announcement” on 17 April 2007, this collaborative approach was unilaterally abandoned.¹ The State Government immediately established the Local Government Reform Commission (LGRC), an independent body tasked with recommending a program of forced amalgamations across Queensland.¹ This sudden reversal has been interpreted by academic analysis as evidence that the voluntary SSS program was not delivering the government’s deeper, unstated agenda: the rapid creation of a more regionalised system of local government.¹ The rhetoric of sustainability, while still publicly prominent, became the justification for a predetermined structural outcome rather than the guiding principle of a cooperative reform process. This top-down, coercive process was executed with remarkable speed and generated significant controversy and community opposition. Federally funded plebiscites held in 85 communities facing amalgamation were almost universally rejected, yet these democratic expressions were summarily disregarded by the state.¹ This forcible imposition of structural change, in direct opposition to local sentiment, created a legacy of resentment and distrust that would shadow the new councils from their inception.¹

Forging a Council on a Foundation of Weakness

The specific case of the North Burnett Regional Council provides the most compelling evidence of the State’s contradictory policy agenda. The NBRC was formed through one of the most complex mergers of the 2008 reforms, combining six distinct and long-standing local government areas: the Shires of Biggenden, Eidsvold, Gayndah, Monto, Mundubbera, and Perry.¹ The LGRC’s official justification for this specific merger highlighted perceived “inefficiencies with having six local governments to manage the economic and community interests of a relatively small geographic region which has a static population”.¹

This official rationale, however, contained a fundamental and fatal flaw. The State’s own Queensland Treasury had already assessed the financial sustainability of the six constituent shires prior to the amalgamation. As detailed in Table 1.1, those assessments rated four of the six shires—Eidsvold, Gayndah, Monto, and Mundubbera—as “weak”.¹ Therefore, the state-sanctioned plan was not to create a stronger entity by merging weak councils into a robust one; it was to forge a new council from a collection of predominantly financially vulnerable parts. This decision prioritized the structural goal of creating a single regional entity over the stated public objective of ensuring financial sustainability. In effect, the State Government knowingly built the new council on a foundation of pre-existing, state-identified financial weakness.

This flawed logic was not lost on the local councils themselves. Five of the six shires formally opposed the LGRC’s model, proposing alternative, smaller-scale mergers or amalgamations with councils outside the immediate region. This local expertise and opposition were ultimately ignored, and the LGRC’s recommendation was implemented without change, cementing a structure that was unwanted by most of its constituent parts and built on a demonstrably weak financial base.¹

The following table:

Table 1.1: Profile of the Pre-Amalgamation Shires (c. 2006-2007)

Shire Name	Area (km2)	Population (2006)	Admin Centre & Pop. (2006)	Primary Economic Drivers	Queensland Treasury Financial Sustainability Rating (2007)
Perry	2,359	431	Mount Perry (169)	Cattle Grazing, Mining	Not Weak
Biggenden	1,316	1,565	Biggenden (664)	Cattle Grazing, Dairying, Orcharding	Not Weak
Gayndah	2,709	2,788	Gayndah (1745)	Cattle Grazing, Orcharding (Fruit & Nuts)	Weak
Mundubbera	4,193	2,117	Mundubbera (1053)	Cattle Grazing, Orcharding (Fruit & Nuts)	Weak
Eidsvold	4,809	859	Eidsvold (459)	Cattle Grazing, Orcharding (Fruit & Nuts)	Weak
Monto	4,322	2,434	Monto (1159)	Cattle Grazing, Irrigated Crops	Weak
Totals	19,708	10,194

Source: Data synthesized from.¹

The “Original Sin”: A Legacy of Duplication and Dispersion

The immediate and enduring consequence of this flawed merger was the creation of a local government with immense structural disadvantages. The new NBRC inherited a duplicated and geographically dispersed asset base, including multiple administration centres, works depots, libraries, swimming pools, and other community facilities spread across its six former shire centres.¹ This inherited portfolio of duplicated infrastructure must be maintained, staffed, and eventually renewed, creating a structurally higher per-capita cost for service delivery that is not faced by councils with a more historically centralised settlement pattern.¹

This high fixed-cost base is supported by a small and demographically static population of just over 10,000 people, spread across a vast land area of 19,670 square kilometres.¹ This results in an extremely low population density of approximately 0.53 persons per square kilometre, one of the lowest among its peer councils.¹ This combination—a high-cost, duplicated asset base and a low-revenue, dispersed ratepayer base—is the “original sin” of the NBRC’s creation. It established an unsustainable mismatch between the council’s greatly expanded operational responsibilities and its structurally limited revenue-raising capacity, pushing it onto a path of chronic financial distress from its very first day of operation. The State Government, in its pursuit of a regionalised governance model, not only ignored the financial realities of the constituent parts but created a new entity whose very structure made the goal of long-term financial sustainability almost impossible to achieve.

Section 2: A Legacy of Financial Distress and Governance Failure

The predictable outcome of the NBRC’s flawed inception has been a sixteen-year history of financial struggle and systemic governance failure. The structural weaknesses embedded in the council at its creation have manifested as chronic operating deficits, a growing backlog of unfunded asset maintenance, and a pattern of poor governance that has been repeatedly identified by the state’s independent financial watchdog, the Queensland Audit Office (QAO). These financial and governance failures are not separate issues; they are locked in a mutually reinforcing cycle. The lack of basic, legally required governance structures prevents effective financial oversight, which predictably leads to poor financial outcomes. In turn, the constant financial crisis consumes all administrative capacity, preventing the council from undertaking the difficult work of fixing its broken governance systems.

A Chronicle of Deficits

Since its formation in 2008, the NBRC has been plagued by near-perpetual financial instability. The council has managed to record an operating surplus in only three of its eighteen budgets.¹ Tellingly, the last recorded surplus in the 2016-2017 financial year was not the result of sustainable operational efficiencies but was achieved only through the one-off receipt of external flood recovery grants, masking an underlying structural deficit.¹

This trend of operating losses has become more severe in recent years. An analysis of the council’s own budget documents reveals a pattern of escalating deficits and a consistent failure to meet its own financial targets.¹ For the 2023-24 financial year, the council’s original budget projected an operating deficit of -$4.560 million. However, the estimated actual result is a deficit of -$7.721 million—a staggering adverse variance of $3.161 million, meaning the actual deficit was 69.3% larger than what was planned and communicated to the community.¹ This was driven primarily by a significant blowout in recurrent expenses, which exceeded the budget by $3.7 million.¹ This pattern demonstrates a systemic challenge in financial planning and control, culminating in a worsening financial crisis that is masked only by accounting shifts and advance grant payments.¹

The Hidden Debt: A Widening Asset Renewal Gap

Compounding the problem of operating deficits is the “hidden debt” of deferred asset maintenance. The NBRC is responsible for a vast portfolio of community infrastructure, but it is failing to invest enough to repair and replace these assets as they age. The key metric for this is the Asset Sustainability Ratio, which compares capital expenditure on renewals to the annual depreciation expense. An acceptable industry benchmark is a ratio greater than 90%.¹

While NBRC’s ratio has been volatile, often propped up by large, one-off grant-funded projects, the council’s own long-term forecast reveals an unsustainable baseline. The ratio is forecast to plummet to just 85% in FY2026 and a deeply concerning 78% by FY2027.¹ This planned underinvestment means the council is knowingly allowing its infrastructure backlog to grow, creating a “bow wave” of future costs. The forecast for FY2026 and FY2027 alone shows a combined asset renewal funding shortfall of over $6.6 million.¹ This directly confirms the QAO’s 2019-20 finding that the council was not investing enough to replace essential assets like roads, bridges, and water pipes.¹ Deferring necessary renewals does not eliminate the cost; it merely pushes it into the future, often at a higher price, while increasing the risk of asset failures and service disruptions for the community.¹

The following table uses the council’s own data to quantify its unsustainable trajectory on both its operating position and its asset renewal obligations.

The following table:

Table 2.1: NBRC Financial Sustainability Ratios vs. Targets (FY2025-FY2027 Forecast)

Financial Sustainability Metric	Target	FY2025 (Budget)	FY2026 (Forecast)	FY2027 (Forecast)
Operating Surplus Ratio	>0% (Min. -2%)	-16%	-14%	-13%
Asset Sustainability Ratio	>90%	137%	85%	78%

Source: Data synthesized from.¹

The Watchdog Ignored: A Pattern of QAO Warnings

The NBRC’s financial decline has occurred alongside, and been enabled by, a profound and long-standing failure of internal governance. The Queensland Audit Office, the state’s independent financial watchdog, has repeatedly raised serious red flags about the council’s operations. The findings, summarized in Table 2.2, paint a damning picture of an organization with chronically weak controls and a culture that appears resistant to scrutiny.¹

In its critical 2019-20 report, the QAO officially rated NBRC as being at a “Higher risk” for financial sustainability—the most serious rating it gives. The report found the council was structurally unprofitable, spending about $1.11 for every dollar it earned. Most alarmingly, it assessed all five components of the council’s internal control system as only “partially effective,” pointing to a complete breakdown in the ability to govern itself, from leadership’s “tone at the top” to day-to-day safety checks.¹

Perhaps the most critical failure identified by the QAO is the council’s illegal operation without a functioning internal audit function. The Local Government Act requires every council to have one, as it provides a fundamental safety net of independent checks on a council’s operations, risks, and spending. As of June 2022, the QAO confirmed that NBRC did not have an internal audit function, a direct breach of the law.¹ This lack of an internal watchdog is a clear example of the council’s inaction on high-risk warnings. This pattern of poor governance is further evidenced by the QAO’s finding that NBRC failed to meet the legal deadline for its financial reporting in three of the last five years.¹

The council’s attitude towards these serious findings was revealed in its official response to the QAO’s draft 2023 report. The formal response, sent by the CEO, was that the council “has no comments”.¹ This passive response stands in stark contrast to the detailed replies provided by other organizations and raises serious questions about whether the council’s leadership was truly engaging with or acknowledging the severity of its long-standing problems.¹

The following table:

Table 2.2: Summary of Key QAO Findings and NBRC Status (2019-2024)

Finding	QAO Assessment	Implication for Ratepayers
Financial Sustainability Risk	Rated “Higher risk” in 2019-20. Council is structurally unprofitable and spending more than it earns.	Increased risk to the delivery and quality of essential services like roads, water, and parks.
Internal Controls	All five components of the internal control system rated as only “partially effective” in 2019-20.	Lack of basic checks and balances to protect public money from waste, mismanagement, and fraud.
Internal Audit Function	Council did not have an internal audit function as of June 2022, a direct breach of the Local Government Act.	A fundamental safety net for accountability is missing. It is extremely difficult to know if money is being spent wisely.
Financial Reporting	“Not timely” and “Below average” quality in 2019-20. Failed to meet legal deadlines in 3 of the last 5 years.	The community is denied the timely, accurate information needed to hold the council accountable.
Response to Scrutiny	Council provided “no comments” in response to the draft 2023 QAO report.	Raises serious questions about the council’s willingness to acknowledge and address its systemic problems.

Source: Data synthesized from.¹

The Administrative Quagmire

The financial and governance crises have been exacerbated by the immense and protracted administrative burden of the amalgamation itself. The task of merging the distinct operational frameworks, cultures, and systems of six separate councils created what can be described as an “administrative deficit” that directly fueled the financial deficit.¹ A clear indicator of this difficulty is the time it took to harmonize land-use policy; the NBRC’s first unified planning scheme did not commence until November 2014, more than six and a half years after the merger.¹ This lengthy process consumed significant staff time and resources that could have been directed toward service delivery or strategic initiatives. The amalgamation also led to a loss of invaluable institutional knowledge, with the retirement of experienced staff necessitating a shift to more “scientific,” and likely more costly, consultant-driven approaches to essential tasks like road maintenance programming.¹ This ongoing and unresolved administrative crisis has consumed resources, hindered effective governance, and prevented the council from ever achieving the efficiencies that were the core promise of the 2008 reforms.

Section 3: The State-Council Nexus: Funding, Oversight, and the Politics of Dependency

The financial crisis facing the North Burnett Regional Council cannot be understood in isolation. It is an acute manifestation of systemic funding and governance challenges that affect all local governments in Australia, particularly those in rural and regional areas. The relationship between the NBRC and the Queensland Government is complex, defined by a fundamental power imbalance, a high degree of financial dependency, and funding models that fail to address the unique structural burdens placed on the council by the state-led amalgamation. This dynamic creates a “dependency trap”: the council’s profound financial weakness makes it highly reliant on state-administered grants, yet this very dependency neuters its ability to be a forceful and critical advocate for the funding reforms it needs to survive, for fear of political retribution from the government that holds the power of both the purse and dismissal.

An Unequal Partnership: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Cost-Shifting

The foundational issue underpinning local government finance in Australia is a severe vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI).⁴ This is the disparity between the revenue-raising abilities of the three tiers of government and their respective spending obligations. As the Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ) has repeatedly highlighted, for every dollar of taxation revenue collected in Australia, local governments receive just three cents, compared to approximately 17 cents for state governments and 80 cents for the Commonwealth.¹ This structural disparity leaves councils with the primary responsibility for a vast portfolio of on-the-ground community infrastructure and services but with the smallest share of public revenue.⁷

This imbalance is exacerbated by the phenomenon of “cost-shifting,” where councils are increasingly forced to become the “provider of last resort” for services that are properly the responsibility of state and federal governments or the private sector.¹ LGAQ research estimates this creates a $360 million annual funding black hole for Queensland councils, who step in to run services like childcare or purchase buildings for health clinics when no one else will.¹ Furthermore, Federal Financial Assistance Grants (FAGs)—a key source of untied funding for rural councils—have been “flatlining” for years, failing to keep pace with the rising costs of delivering services.¹ These systemic issues create a high-pressure environment for all councils, but their impact is amplified for an entity like NBRC, whose structural flaws leave it with no financial buffer to absorb these pressures.

Funding Formulas and the “Cost of Amalgamation”

The NBRC’s specific financial situation is defined by an extremely high dependency on external grant funding. In FY2023, grants, subsidies, and contributions accounted for 58% of the council’s total operating revenue.¹ As shown in Table 3.1, this is substantially higher than peer councils with stronger, resource-sector economies like Central Highlands (23%) and Isaac (19%), underscoring NBRC’s limited capacity to generate its own revenue and its heightened exposure to external funding decisions.¹

A critical component of this funding is the Commonwealth Financial Assistance Grant (FAG), which is distributed in Queensland by the Queensland Local Government Grants Commission (QLGGC) based on the principle of horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE).¹ This principle aims to ensure all councils can provide similar service standards by compensating for differences in their expenditure needs and revenue-raising capacity.¹

However, the analysis of FAG allocations suggests the current formula may be failing the NBRC. While NBRC’s per capita FAG allocation is higher than several larger regional councils, it is lower than that of other geographically vast and sparsely populated shires like Charters Towers and Maranoa.¹ This discrepancy suggests that the QLGGC’s formula, which relies on standard metrics like road length and population dispersion, is not giving sufficient weight to the unique and enduring “cost disability” that arises specifically from NBRC’s amalgamated structure. The need to maintain core infrastructure and services across six distinct former shire centres, rather than one or two main hubs, creates a multiplier effect on costs that is not fully captured by the existing model.¹ This forms the basis of a strong technical argument that NBRC’s specific structural disadvantages, imposed upon it by the state, warrant a re-evaluation and a specific loading within the FAGs model to achieve genuine fiscal equalisation.

The following table:

Table 3.1: Comparative Grant Funding and Dependency (FY2023) – NBRC vs. Peer Group

Council Name	Per Capita Total Grant Revenue (A$)	Grant Revenue as % of Total Operating Revenue
North Burnett RC	$2,924	58%
Banana SC	$3,049	45%
Charters Towers RC	$4,674	62%
Goondiwindi RC	$3,015	48%
Maranoa RC	$3,817	51%
Central Highlands RC	$1,459	23%
Isaac RC	$1,748	19%
Western Downs RC	$1,561	29%
South Burnett RC	$1,186	41%
Southern Downs RC	$1,291	38%
Murweh SC	$6,602	65%

Source: Data synthesized from.¹

The Politics of Dependency: The “Critical Friend” Dilemma

The relationship between local and state government in Queensland is constitutionally one of subordination. Local councils are created by the State Parliament and can be “created, amalgamated, abolished, or dismissed by the state at will”.¹ The

Local Government Act 2009 grants the Minister for Local Government significant powers of intervention, including the power to suspend or dissolve an entire council if the Minister reasonably believes it is “in the public interest” to do so.¹³

This fundamental power imbalance creates a significant political risk for a highly grant-dependent council like NBRC to be openly and aggressively critical of the State Government. An adversarial approach could jeopardize the flow of discretionary grants or, in an extreme scenario, trigger ministerial intervention. This reality necessitates a sophisticated and nuanced advocacy strategy. Rather than engaging in solo, public confrontation, the strategically sounder path for NBRC is to work collectively through the LGAQ, which acts as the peak body and primary interface between councils and the state and federal governments.¹⁵ The LGAQ can advocate for systemic reforms, such as addressing VFI or cost-shifting, on behalf of all 77 councils, providing political cover for individual members.

Simultaneously, NBRC must pursue a technical, evidence-based advocacy track. This involves developing a robust, data-driven case, like that outlined in the grant comparison report ¹, to argue for a specific adjustment to the FAGs formula. This case should be presented directly to the technocratic body responsible for the formula, the QLGGC, rather than being prosecuted in the political arena. This dual approach—collective political advocacy through the LGAQ and targeted technical advocacy to the QLGGC—is the most viable strategy for a council caught in the dependency trap, allowing it to be a “critical friend” to the state without risking a damaging political fallout.

Section 4: The Tipping Point: Anatomy of the 2025-2026 Budget and Rate Rise

The unprecedented 25% general rate increase imposed by the NBRC for the 2025-2026 financial year was not an isolated mistake or a simple response to inflationary pressures. It was the acute, visible symptom of the chronic, underlying governance diseases that have plagued the council for over a decade. The procedural failures that characterized the budget’s adoption, as detailed in the North Burnett Ratepayers Alliance’s (NBRA) formal submission, represent a “cascade of systemic governance failures”.¹ A council that ignores its legal duty to maintain an internal audit function and has been cited for system-wide weaknesses in its internal controls is precisely the kind of organization where a rushed, non-compliant, and high-risk budget process can occur.¹ The crisis did not happen in a vacuum; it happened because the council’s institutional immune system was already severely compromised.

A Cascade of Systemic Failures

The process that culminated in the extreme rate rise appears to have been in material conflict with the council’s own publicly adopted governance frameworks and the principles of the Local Government Act 2009.¹ The central and most critical flaw was the severely compressed timeline. The NBRA alleges that the final, definitive 25% figure for the general rate increase was presented to Councillors only one week prior to the formal budget adoption vote, while previous discussions had centered on a more moderate increase of up to 10%.¹ This is not a minor oversight; it is a foundational failure that actively prevents elected members from fulfilling their statutory duty of diligent consideration and meaningful participation.¹ The anecdote reported in the NBRA’s analysis—that a councillor was compelled to ask for a basic financial comparison between a 10% and a 25% rate rise during the very meeting where the vote was held—is a telling indictment of an uninformed decision-making environment.¹

This initial failure of timeliness triggered a cascade of subsequent policy breaches, as the council’s own process-driven systems for risk management and community engagement require significant lead time to execute properly.¹ The key breaches include:

• Breach of Enterprise Risk Management Policy (2213): The process was a textbook example of reactive management, in direct contradiction to the policy’s mandate for “proactive rather than reactive risk management practices”.¹ It appears to have bypassed the very due diligence the policy was designed to ensure, failing to apply the prescribed treatments for at least three of the council’s own identified strategic risks: Constrained Revenue, Systemic Disruption, and Failing to Meet Community Expectations.¹
• Material Breach of Community Engagement and Consultation Policy (2215): This is perhaps the clearest and most indefensible breach. The policy contains an explicit and unequivocal prohibition: “engagement will not be undertaken where a decision has already been made”.¹ The council’s public meetings, held
  after the formal vote to adopt the budget, constitute a direct violation of this rule. This also breaches the policy’s “Timely” principle, which requires engagement to occur when the community can still influence outcomes.¹ Engagement that cannot influence a decision is, by the policy’s own definition, not genuine engagement.

A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

The most powerful evidence of the council’s governance failure lies within its own documentation. The council’s Strategic Risk Register (October 2021) was not merely a list of abstract possibilities; it was a predictive instrument that accurately forecast the consequences of the path the council chose.¹ The register explicitly identifies “Inadequate or deficient community engagement” and a “lack of meaningful data / feedback from the community” as primary causes for the risk of “Failing to meet community expectations”.¹ With chilling accuracy, the register warns that the consequence of this risk materializing would be “Reputational damage, disillusionment and loss of public confidence”.¹

The widespread community anger and loss of trust that the council is now experiencing is not an unfortunate or unforeseen side effect. It is the direct, predictable, and self-inflicted fulfilment of a warning contained within the council’s own formal risk documentation. The council did not manage this risk; it actively and predictably realised it, demonstrating a worrying disregard for its own internal analysis and corporate memory.¹

Perverse Incentives and Avoided Conversations

The NBRA’s analysis raises a critical question: why would the council avoid a standard and necessary public discussion about service levels as a potential alternative to a massive rate hike? One potential explanation points to a critical governance failure in the form of a perverse incentive. The submission posits that if an internal Key Performance Indicator (KPI) for the CEO or senior management exists that specifies “no reduction in services to community,” it may have created an inflexible boundary that inadvertently subverted good governance.¹

In an environment of “Constrained Revenue” (Strategic Risk #1), a rigid mandate for no service cuts creates immense pressure to find revenue from the only source the council fully controls: general rates. This could explain the apparent reluctance to engage in a complex, nuanced discussion with the community about service levels—such as the potential regionalisation of a library or swimming pool—as such a discussion might lead to outcomes that would cause the KPI to be missed.¹ If true, this would represent a serious failure of governance, where an internal performance measure is allowed to override the council’s broader policy commitments and statutory obligations to engage its community in making difficult financial trade-offs.

Section 5: Alternative Pathways: Lessons from Amalgamation in Regional Queensland

The North Burnett Regional Council’s post-amalgamation experience is not unique, but its outcomes stand in contrast to those of other amalgamated councils that have navigated the post-2008 landscape more successfully. An analysis of these peers reveals that the theoretical benefits of amalgamation—the “amalgamation dividend”—do not materialize automatically as cost savings. Instead, this dividend must be understood as an “enhanced strategic capacity,” a potential that must be actively unlocked through deliberate strategic choices in governance, administration, and financial management. By benchmarking NBRC against two such councils, Goondiwindi and Central Highlands, it is possible to identify clear, alternative pathways that NBRC has, to date, been unable to pursue.

Case Study 1: Goondiwindi Regional Council (GRC) – The Strategy of Cohesion

Goondiwindi Regional Council (GRC) serves as a compelling case study, as its initial scale was remarkably similar to NBRC’s. At the time of the 2008 reforms, the amalgamated Goondiwindi region had a population of approximately 10,400 and covered an area of over 19,000 square kilometres, making it a near-perfect demographic and geographic analogue to North Burnett.¹

However, a critical difference lay in the complexity of the merger. GRC was formed from just three entities (the Town of Goondiwindi and the Shires of Waggamba and Inglewood), half the number merged to create NBRC.¹ This lower level of initial complexity was a significant advantage, but GRC’s subsequent success was driven by a deliberate strategy of

cohesion.¹ Politically, the council operates as an undivided entity, with a mayor and six councillors elected by the entire region, a model that encourages a whole-of-region perspective and mitigates parochialism.¹ Administratively, the council adopted a simple and clear structure with just two primary directorates.¹ It also moved proactively to integrate its workforce, establishing a new Certified Agreement just over a year after the merger to build a unified organizational culture.¹ Most importantly, GRC’s long-term corporate plan is explicitly aligned with the region’s core economic drivers—primarily agriculture—ensuring that council resources are invested in ways that directly support the economic base that generates the region’s revenue.¹

Case Study 2: Central Highlands Regional Council (CHRC) – The Strategy of Scale and Investment

Central Highlands Regional Council (CHRC) presents a different model of success, one based on leveraging greater scale and a stronger economic base. Formed from four large rural shires, CHRC governs a vast territory of nearly 60,000 square kilometres and had a growing population of over 30,000 at the time of amalgamation.¹ Its economy, dominated by the Bowen Basin coal mining industry, provided the new council with a substantial rate base, a stark contrast to NBRC’s agricultural and demographically declining profile.¹

This strong financial foundation enabled CHRC to pursue a strategy of leveraging scale and strategic investment. Recognizing the challenge of merging four separate organizations, the council’s leadership invested heavily in creating unified, enterprise-wide systems to serve as the administrative backbone for the new entity. This included the region-wide implementation of the Civica Authority system for financials and the Technology One system for electronic records management.¹ While costly upfront, these investments created a single, standardized platform, eliminating the inefficiencies of managing four legacy systems.¹ This financial and administrative capacity allowed CHRC to deliver new, sophisticated regional services, such as a regional Flood Alert Network providing live data to the public.¹ Furthermore, CHRC demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how to use its scale externally, partnering with the neighbouring Isaac Regional Council in 2018 to jointly procure waste and recycling services, leveraging their combined scale to attract more competitive bids.¹

Comparative Analysis: Why NBRC Faltered

A direct comparison of the three councils highlights the critical factors that separated the more successful post-amalgamation pathways from NBRC’s. The initial conditions at the time of the merger, combined with the strategic choices made in the subsequent years, created vastly different outcomes. NBRC was hampered from the outset by a combination of high merger complexity (six entities) and a challenging economic context of population decline. This created a difficult operating environment where the council became stuck in a reactive, crisis-management mode, perpetually bogged down in the administrative and financial fallout of its flawed creation. It was unable to pursue either GRC’s strategy of building a cohesive regional identity or CHRC’s strategy of investing in foundational systems and leveraging its scale. The experience of these three councils demonstrates that the “amalgamation dividend” is not a given; it is an earned outcome of sound governance, smart investment, and a clear understanding of the new regional entity’s identity and purpose.

The following tables, drawn from the comparative analysis, starkly illustrate the different starting points and subsequent strategic paths of the three councils.

The following table:

Table 5.1: Comparative Council Profile (at Amalgamation, c. 2008)

Council Name	Population (c. 2008)	Land Area (km2)	Number of Merged Entities	Primary Economic Base
North Burnett RC	10,646	19,708	6	Agriculture
Goondiwindi RC	10,399	19,284	3	Agriculture
Central Highlands RC	~30,403 (in 2009)	59,884	4	Mining, Agriculture

Source: Data synthesized from.¹

The following table:

Table 5.2: Post-Amalgamation Strategic Approaches & Outcomes

Strategic Area	North Burnett RC (Observed Outcome)	Goondiwindi RC (Strategy)	Central Highlands RC (Strategy)
Administrative Structure	High complexity from merging 6 entities; ongoing financial strain.	Simple, unified structure with an Executive Office and two directorates; undivided council.	Evolving centralized model with 5 core departments; initial area management for service continuity.
Workforce Integration	Complex due to 6 legacy workforces; formal agreement established.	Proactive integration via a Certified Agreement and joint consultative committee.	Formal Human Resources Management Plan focused on retention and skills development.
IT & Systems Integration	Not specified; likely complex and protracted.	Not specified; likely less complex due to fewer merged entities.	Strategic investment in enterprise-wide systems for finance (Civica) and records (ECM).
Financial Planning	Chronic operating deficits; reliance on grants; significant rate rises.	Early adoption of integrated operational plans and budgets with quarterly performance reviews.	Strong financial position enabling strategic investment and management of major crises.
Inter-Council Collaboration	Not evident in available materials.	Not evident in available materials.	Proactive joint procurement for major services (e.g., waste collection with Isaac RC).
New/Enhanced Services	Focus on maintaining basic services under financial pressure.	Focus on aligning service delivery with the needs of the core agricultural economy.	New Flood Alert Network, expanded digital library services, kerbside recycling.

Source: Data synthesized from.¹

Section 6: A Framework for Renewal: A Strategic Action Plan for Ratepayers and Council

The preceding analysis has diagnosed a complex and deeply rooted crisis at the North Burnett Regional Council, stemming from a flawed amalgamation and perpetuated by a cycle of financial distress and governance failure. Simply highlighting these failures is insufficient. This final section synthesizes all findings into a comprehensive and actionable framework for renewal, addressing the user’s core request for a path forward. This framework is presented in two parts: a plan for the North Burnett Ratepayers Alliance to pursue accountability, and a set of evidence-based recommendations for the Council to adopt to achieve long-term sustainability. The ultimate goal should not be defined as simply reversing a rate rise or dismissing the council; the structural problems are too deep. True success lies in forcing a fundamental and lasting reset of the council’s governance, financial management, and strategic direction, thereby curing the underlying disease rather than just treating the most recent symptom.

Part A: Avenues for Accountability (For the Ratepayers’ Alliance)

The NBRA is uniquely positioned to act as a catalyst for change. To be effective, it should adopt a “critical friend” strategy, balancing robust, evidence-based confrontation with a constructive, solution-oriented approach. The goal is not just to punish, but to reform. This requires a disciplined, multi-pronged campaign targeting the relevant external oversight bodies in a coordinated sequence, where the output of one action becomes a powerful input for the next. The integrated action plan outlined in Table 6.1 provides a detailed roadmap for this campaign.

The primary avenues for formal redress by the Ratepayers Alliance are:
(As the alliance, not as individual)

1. The Queensland Ombudsman: This is the most potent avenue. The complaint should be laser-focused on process failure, arguing that the council committed serious maladministration by failing to follow its own mandatory policies on risk management (2213) and community engagement (2215).¹ The evidence of the post-decision “consultation” is a particularly clear and indefensible breach.¹ A finding of maladministration from the Ombudsman would carry immense political and moral weight and could lead to recommendations for an independent audit and a complete overhaul of the council’s budget process.¹
2. The Office of the Independent Assessor (OIA): This is a parallel track targeting the conduct of the individual councillors who voted for the budget. The complaint should allege that by voting on a matter of such magnitude with allegedly inadequate information and time for deliberation, these councillors failed to meet their statutory responsibilities to be “conscientious” and “participate meaningfully” under the Councillor Code of Conduct.¹ While a higher evidentiary bar, a successful complaint could result in disciplinary action and would place direct pressure on the elected members.¹
3. The Minister for Local Government: This is the highest level of escalation. The appeal to the Minister must be framed as a case of systemic governance breakdown, demonstrating that the council’s actions have led to such a profound loss of public confidence that its democratic legitimacy is in question.¹ While direct intervention like dismissal is a low-probability outcome reserved for the most extreme cases, a formal request for a “please explain” or a directive for a departmental governance review is a much more probable and still highly valuable outcome.¹ The key to success here is to present the Minister with the final, independent report from the Queensland Ombudsman’s investigation, which would provide the third-party validation a Minister would likely require before considering any form of intervention.

Part B: A Pathway to Sustainability (For the Council)

Accountability for past failures must be paired with a constructive and evidence-based plan for the future. The NBRA should advocate for the Council to adopt a comprehensive recovery plan based on the successful strategies of its peers, Goondiwindi and Central Highlands. The following four pathways offer a roadmap to finally address the NBRC’s foundational weaknesses and build genuine, long-term sustainability.¹

1. Administrative and Governance Consolidation (The Goondiwindi Model): The council must undertake a comprehensive review of its administrative structure with the goal of simplification and consolidation. The high complexity of merging six entities may have resulted in a structure that is inefficient and costly to maintain. Moving towards a simpler model with fewer directorates could reduce overheads and improve decision-making. Furthermore, the council should initiate a community conversation about the benefits of moving to an undivided council structure, which can foster a “whole-of-region” mindset among councillors and reduce parochial tensions over resource allocation.¹
2. Forging Strategic Alliances for Service Delivery (The Central Highlands Model): NBRC can achieve economies of scale without being a large council by proactively forming strategic partnerships with its neighbours. The joint waste procurement contract between Central Highlands and Isaac Regional Councils provides a proven template.¹ NBRC should formally investigate opportunities for joint tendering and shared service agreements with adjacent councils like South Burnett, Bundaberg, and Banana for high-cost services such as road maintenance, fleet management, specialized IT services, and waste collection. This would leverage the collective bargaining power of a larger group to secure more favorable contracts and improve service quality.¹
3. A Disciplined Financial and Asset Management Framework: The council must adopt and adhere to a rigorous long-term financial and asset management framework, as promoted by the Department of Local Government and the Queensland Treasury Corporation.¹ This must include a realistic 10-year financial forecast that explicitly accounts for the region’s demographic reality and prioritizes the sustainable maintenance and renewal of existing essential infrastructure over expansionary capital works. This disciplined approach is crucial to breaking the cycle of operating deficits, closing the asset renewal gap, and achieving long-term financial stability.¹
4. Aligning Council Strategy with Regional Economic Identity: Following the lead of Goondiwindi, NBRC should develop a new Corporate Plan that is explicitly and deeply integrated with the economic realities and opportunities of the North Burnett region. The plan must identify the key industries—primarily agriculture and related sectors—that form the region’s economic foundation and strategically align the council’s discretionary spending and infrastructure priorities to support them. This ensures that every available dollar is deployed in a way that strengthens the economic base, thereby supporting the long-term sustainability of the council itself and delivering tangible value to the communities it serves.¹

By pursuing these pathways, the North Burnett Regional Council can begin the difficult but necessary work of moving beyond its troubled past. For the ratepayers, advocating for this comprehensive agenda of accountability and reform offers the only viable path to ensuring a stronger, more transparent, and more responsive local government for the future.

Works cited

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